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This paper analyzes the intertemporal efficiency and
optimality of steady states within overlapping-generations
models in which the utility of individual working couples
depends on the consumption of their parents and children
as well as their own consumption. The analysis considers
both a basic model in which altruistic behavior can take only
the form of gifts of consumption goods from working couples
to their retired parents and an extended model in which
altruistic behavior also. can take the form of bequests from
parents to their surviving children. In the basic model,
saving only involves storing consumption goods, whereas
the extended model includes capital and neoclassical produc-
tion.
The following conclusions from the analysis apply to
both models: An altruistic utility function promotes inter—
temporal efficiency. However, altruism creates an
externality that implies that satisfying the conditions for
efficiency does not insure intertemporal optimality.
Nevertheless, if the utility of working couples is appropriately
;ensitive at the: margin to their own consumption, their
pirents' consumption, and their children's consumption, the
steady state that is consistent with individual behavior is





(401)863—2606The specification of efficiency and optimality conditions
for intertemporal resource allocation and the possible
inconsistency between these conditions and the consequences of
private decision making within a context of overlapping
generations have traditionally been central issues in the
theoretical analysis of the long—run evolution of the
economy——see, for example, Samuelson (1958) ,Diamond(1965)
and Cass and Yaari (1966) .Recently,the development of more
goneral behavioral models that allow for voluntary private
intergenerational giving-—for example, support of retired
parents by working children and bequests from deceased parents
to surviving children——has provided a new perspective for
analyzing these issues—-see, for example, Barro (1974; 1976)
Drazen (1978) ,andBuiter (1979) .Thepresent paper continues
this recent line of inquiry by considering intertemporal
efficiency and optimality within models of familial love,
formalized in the assumption that the utility of individual
orkinq couples depends on the consumption of their parents
and children as well as their own consumption.
The main conclusions from this analysis are the following:
An interterriporally altruistic utility function promotes
intertemporal efficiency. However, with such an altruistic
utility function, in contrast to the models of Cass and Yaari
and Diamond, satisfying the conditions for efficiency does
not insure intertemporal optimality. Nevertheless, there
exist strong hut plausible restrictions on an altruistic utility
function that make the results of private behavior both efficient
and optimal.—2—
1. Children Love Parents
The analysis in the first part of the paper extends the
model of Cass and Yaari by assuming that a working couple's
utility depends positively on the past and current consumption
of each set of its retired parents. This form of familial love
creates the possibility of altruistic behavior in the form. of
voluntary gifts of consumption goods from working couples to
their retired parents. Aside from this extension, this basic
model follows the Cass and Yaari setup. Specifically, the
analysis abstracts from stochastic factors and assumes that
the life cycle consists of one working period and one retired
period, that labor services are the only productive input,
and that consumption goods, which can be storable, are the only
product.
Historical and heuristic interest in the Cass and Yaari
model provides motivation for using this setup. More
importantly, however, analysis of this basic model yields
general results about the way in which familial love affects
the relation between private behavior and intertemporal
efficiency and optimality. The second part of the paper extends
these results by incorporating into the analysis love of parents
for their surviving children, the resulting possibility of
altruistic behavior in the form of bequests, and neoclassical
production relations involving both capital services and
labor services.
1.1 Specification of the Basic Model
The lifetime utility of each couple who is working during
the current period, denoted by U, is given by
=U(c,c, c1, c1)
where c represents consumption per couple, the superscripts
denote working and retired periods, and the subscripts identify
.a generation by the date of its working period. specifically,—3—
according to this notation,
c is the current consumption of the current working couple,
c is its prospective future consumption during retired years,
is the past consumption of each set of its retired parents
during their working years, and
is the current consumption of each set of its retired parents.
Each of these arguments is nonnegative.The function U is
increasing in each argument, concave, and twicedifferentiable.
Eachfirst partial derivative approaches infinity as the value
of the respective argument approaches zero.
Thespecification of children's utility as depending on
parents' consumption, rather than on parents' utility as in the
formulations of Drazen and Buiter, seems plausible in that it
relatesthe child's utility directly tothe objectiveevents of
parents' consumption, rather than to the parents' subjective
evaluation of these events. In addition, the dependence of utility
on parents' consumption avoids the convergence problems that
Buiterand Drazenencounter indefining the utility max.imand. The
present formulation effectively links all generations through the
constraintson consumption, given by equations (1.1—4) ,ratherthan
through the utility function.
Theargumentsof the utility functionare determined as
follows:





wherew is real wage income per capita,
s is saving, which takes the form of accumulation of
consumption goods during working years,
g is the amount of consumption goods given by a working
couple to each set of its retired parents,—4—
r is the physical rate of return plus unity onstored
consumption goods, and
n is the number of children per set of parents.
Each of these variables is nonnegative. Note that r
ecrual to zero would represent full depreciation in storage,
thatrequal to unity would represent no depreciationin
storage, and r greater than unity would representappreciation
instorage. Note also that n/2 equals unity plusthe rate of
populationgrowth, which, it is relevant to recall, Samuelson
denotes as the biological rate of return. The basic model
assumes that w, r, and n are exogenouslydetermined and
constant across generations. In the extended model of
neoclassical production in the second part of the paper, wage income
andtiephysical rate of return become endogenousvariables.
1.2 Efficiency and Optimality of Steady States
Denote steady—state values by the absence of the time
subscript. Thus, by definition,
(2.1) c' =2w—— 2g and
(2.2) c2rs +ng.
Followingstandard usage, define as efficient steady states
in which the values of and g maximize c2 for given values
of c', subject to equations (2.1—2). Note that efficiency
involves specifying a consumption possibilities frontier, but
does not concern choosing among points on that frontier.
From the form of equations (2.1-2) and the nonnegativityrestric-
tions on c', c2, s, and g, we can infer the following efficiency
properties:
(Ta) If rn/2, any steady state that conforms to the non—
negativity restrictions is efficient. Specifically, if
r =n/2,efficiency implies 2w >S +2g>0,with 5> 0
andq > 0.—5—
(Ib) If rn/2, efficiency puts additional restrictions or
either s or g. Specifically, if r <n/2,efficiency
impliess =0and w >g>0.Albernatively, if
r >n/2,efficiency implies g =0and 2w >s>0.
Theseresultsindicate that, as a waytoprovide for retirement
consumption, saving is efficient if and only if the physical
rate ofreturnis not less than the biological rate of return
andgifts fromworking children are efficient ifand. onlyif
thebiologicalrate of return is not less than the physical rate
of return.
Againfollowingstandard usage, define as optima'l a steady
state in which Sandg takes values that maximize
U(c1 ,c21c',c2) ,subjectto equations (2.1—2). Given the non—
negativity restrictions and the assumptiOn that the partial
derivativesofU approach infinity as c and c2 approach zero,
the first-order conditions for the solution to the optimality
problem require that c', c2, s, and g satisfy a pair of the
following possible restrictions:
either (3.1) —(U+ U )+r(U+U )= 0and 2w -2g>s>0,
1 3 2 tf
or(3.2) —(U+U)+ r(U+U)< 0and.S0,and
3 2
—
either(3.3) —(U+ U) + (U + U) =0and w —> q > 0,
or (3.4) -(U+ U )+ (U+ U)< 0and g =0,
1 3 2 2
butnot both (3.2) and (3.4).For brevity, the full func—
tional form for each partial derivative, e.g., U(c1,c21c',c2)
is not explicitly written out.
Which of the eligible pairs of conditions (3.1—4) is
applicable depends on the relationbetween r and n/2.
Specifically, the implications of these first-order conditions
fortheontimality properties of a steady stateare the
following:—6—
(ha) If r =n/2,the pairs of conditions (3.1) and (3.3)
(3.1) and (3.4) ,or(3.2) and (3.3) can be relevant.
In this case, optimality restricts only the sum, s +2g.
The optimal value, (s +2g)*,has an interior value,
2w >(S + 2g)*>0,such that c1 and c2 satisfy the
equivalent conditions (3.1) and (3.3), with S> 0
and g>0.
(lib) If r >n/2,the pair of conditions (3.1) and (3.4)
is relevant. In this case, the optimal value, ,
hasan interior value, 2w >s*>0,such that c1
and c2 satisfy condition (3.1) ,andthe optimal value, g*,
has the boundary value, g* =0,that satisfies condi-
tion (3.4)
(ho) If r <n/2,the pair of conditions (3.2) arid (3.3)
is relevant. In this case, s has the boundary value,
s =0,that satisfies condition (3.2) ,andg* has an
interior value, w >g*>0,such that c' and c2 satisfy
condition (3.3)
Note that these results indicate that efficiency is necessary
but not sufficient for optimality.
It is worth stressing that these concepts of efficiency
and optirnality relate only to a normative comparison of possible
steady states. A normative comparison of nonsteady—state paths
would require additional criteria, such as the standard of
Pareto optimality. Although an analysis of such criteria is
beyond the scope of the present paper, two interesting
observations can readily be made: First, an efficient steady
state is Pareto optimal. Second, a path that went from an
arbitrary starting point Lo an efficient steady state in a
single generation generally would not be Pareto optimal.
Specifically, an immediate change from g >0and s =0to
g =0and s >0generally would make either current working
couples or then parents worse off, whereas an immediate change
from g =0and >0to g >0and s =0generally would
make the terminal generations worse off.—7—
1.3 Individual Behavior, Efficiency, and Optimality
Consider if, and under what conditions, individual behavior
is consistent with a steady •state that is efficient or optimal.
The choiceproblem for anindividual current working couple is
toselectvalues for s andto maximize U(c, c, c1, c1)
subject to equations (1.1-4). In addition to the choice vari-
ables, these constraints involve the exogenous variables, w, r,
endn,the predetermined variables, and and the
expectationai variable,
The formation of is important for the results of the
analysis. One simple possibility would be to treat as
exogenous, an assumption that would mean that theindividual
couple believes that its decisions about s. and will not affect
the future decision about made by its children. The problem
withthisassumption is that in general it implies that the
couple does not expect its children to perform the same choice
calculus that it itself is performing.
A more satisfactory treatment is to assume t1at the couple
relates its expectation, to s and in the same way that
its own decision about depends on s1 and Ingeneral,
the value ofthat maximizes U(c, c, c, c1) depends on
because enters into c1 and c1, and depends on
because enters into c1. If,however,the function U is
additively separable in c1, the chosen value of does not
depend on Withthis simplification, we focus attention on
the important consideration that parents' saving, s_1, and
giving to parents, are substitutes in the provision of
parents' current consumption, c1. This substitutability implies
that, for an interior solution, the chosen value of g is inversely
related to 5tl (The lower bound on the derivative of with
respectto st—i would be —r/n, a value that would mean that an
increase in s1 induces a decrease in sufficient to leave
c1unchanged.)—8—
A reasonable specification of rational behavior would seem
to be that the functional relation between and S iS
the same as the functional relation between and Thus,
rationality means that the individual couple expects that,
if it saves more, the amount that it receives from its children
during retired years will be smaller, provided that this
expected amount is not already zero. This belief implies
that the private return from saving can be less than the
physical rate of return, represented by r. Let X denote
the value of the derivative of with respect to
Some other aspects of the individual couple's choice problem
are worth noting. For example, equation (1.4) ,whichdetermines
c1, effectively abstracts from any free rider problem among
siblings. Specifically, this specification of the choice
problem assumes that in selecting and the individual couple
presumes that its siblings also are choosing to give totheir
parents an amount equal to g. A possible rationalization for
this assumption is that the siblings hav a familial under-
standing according to which they act as a single decision maker
in choosing
Thisformulation of the individual couple's choice problem
also makes no explicit allowance for borrowing and lending. This
simplification, however, is not consequential. Because the only
feasible transactions in a loan market would be between members of
the current working generation, such a market would not alter the
form of the constraints faced by the representative working couple.
In light of the nonnegativity restrictions and the assumption
that the partial derivatives of U approach infinity as c, c,
CL1,andcLi approach zero, the first—order conditions for the
solution to the individual couple's choice problem require that s
and satisfy a pair from the following possible restrictions:
either (4.1)—U+ (r+nX) U =0and 2w —2g> St > 0,
or (4.2)-U+ (r+nA) U < 0 and St0, and—9—
either (4.3) —U+U =0and w > g > 0,
i 2 2 t
or (4.4) -U+ U< 0 and g =0.
1 2 Lf t
Again, for brevity, the full functional form for each partial
derivative, e.g., U (ct, c, c1, c1) ,andfor X is not
explicitly written out. The above discussion of the nature of
implies that r+nX is positive, but less than or equal to r.
Let S, G, C', C2, and A denote the steady—statevalues that
are consistent with these first—order conditions and equa-
tions (1.1-4) .Assumingthat in a steady state the expectation,
is correct and, hence, equals 0, the pair of conditions
(4.2) and (4.4) would imply C2 =0and cannot he relevant in a
steady state. Which of the other pairs is relevant in the
steady state depends on the relation between rU andU
2 2
Specifically, the implications of the first-order conditions
(4.1-4)for the characteristics of steady states are the
following:
(lila) If C' and C2 satisfy (r±nA)U =U,the pairs of condi-
tions (4.1) and (4.3), (4.1) and (4.4) ,or(4.2) and (4.3)
can be relevant. In this case, the sum, S + 20, has an
interior value, 2w > S + 2G > 0, that satisfies the
equivalent conditions (4.1) and (4.3) ,withS > 0 and C > 0.
(11Th) If C' and C2 satisfy (r+nA)U >U, the pair of conditions
(4.1) and (4.4) is relevant. In this case, S has an
interior value, 2w > S > 0,that satisfies condition condi-
tion (4.4) .BecauseG does not take an interior value, this
case also has A =0.
(IlIc) If C' and C2 satisfy (r+nA)U <U, the pair of conditions
(4.2) and (4.3) is relevant. In this case, S has the
boundary value, S0, that satisfies condition (4.2)
and G has an interior value, W > G > 0, that satisfies
condition (4.3)— 10—
Notethat Drazen's paper considers what amounts to a special
case of this analysis that assumes A =0,U =rU,S >0,and
n =2,and,inwhich, consequently, G >0requires rU =U
2
Comparingthe characteristics of individual behavior with
he efficiency and optimality properties derived above indicate
that the efficiency and oetimality of S and G depend on the
relation between r and n/2 and on the form of the function U.
Withregardto efficiency, we can draw the following conclusions:
(IVa) From (Ia) ,rn/2 is a sufficient condition for S and G
to be efficient.
(IVb) If rn/2, either inefficient positive saving
orinefficient giving to parents is possible.
Specifically, from (lila—c) ,anecessary condition for S >0
1 2 n
is tnat C and C satisfy (r+nA)U >—U,whereas,
2
from(Ib) ,anecessary and sufficient condition for S >0
to be inefficient is that r <n/2. Similarly, from
(lIla-c) ,anecessary condition for G >0is that C' and C2
satisfy (r+nA)U <U,whereas from (Ib) ,anecessary
and sufficient condition for G >0to be inefficient is
that r >n/2.
(V)If rn/2, from (Ivh) ,anecessary and sufficient
condition for S and G to be efficient is that (r+nA)U U
as r .Asufficient condition for this outcome is that
C' andC2satisfy (l+2A)U =U
2
The possibilityof inefficient positive saving, indicated
in (IVb) ,generalizesa result obtained b Cass and Yaari.
Cass and Yaari stress that, if r <n/2,saving is an inefficient
way to provide retirement consumption. Their model, moreover,
implicitly assumes that working couples associate zero marginal
utility with the consumption of their retired parents. Given
this assumption, only the pair of conditions (4.1) and (4.4) is
relevant .A equals zero, and sispositive for all positive values— 11—
ofr. The analysis in the present section hasderived more
general conditions for S >0that require (r+nA)U >U,
but do not require U 0.
The possibility of inefficient positive giving to parents,
also indicated in (IVb) ,isa further extension of the results of
Cass and Yaari. This possibility arises if r >n/2,in which
case efficiency requires each working generation toset aside
current output to provide for its own future consumptionand G >0
would represent inefficient altruism. The present analysis indicates
he G >0can obtain, regardless of the relation between rand
n/2, if (r+nA)U <U.This condition in turn requires that
working couples associate sufficiently high marginal utilitywith
the current consumption of their retired parents.
More importantly, the present analysis reveals that the
efficiency of individual behavior does not depend only on the
relation between r and n/2. Specifically, (V) indicates that,
whatever the sign of the difference between r and n/2, S and
G are efficient if the difference between (r+nA)Uand U
2 2
has the same sign. In the special case given in (V) ,ifthe
marginal utility that working couples associate with their
parents' current retirement consumption 13 equal to the marginal
utility that they associate with their own prospective retirement
consumption, with the latter weighted by a factor involving the
effect of current saving on future giving, individual behavior is
efficient regardless of the relation between r and n/2. Note
that the present model incorporates two factors, the positive
value of Uand the associated possibility of a negative value
of A, that mitigate in favor of efficiency, but were not
present in the model of Cass and Yaari.
Turning to question of optimality, the critical factor is
the degree of correspondence between conditions (3.1-4) and
conditions (4.1-4) .Asnoted above, efficiency is necessary but
not sufficient for optimality. Specifically, assuming efficiency,
we can draw from (ha—c) and (lila—c) the following conclusions
about iia optimality of S and C:— 12—
(VIa)Ifr=n/2,implying efficiency, and if C and C2 satisfy




(VIb)If r =n/2,implying efficiency, and if C' and C2 satisfy
2 ::+:
+2G(.s + 2g) as C and C2
St1SLy(l+2A)U
(VIa) Ifr<n/2and if C' and C2 satisfy (r±nA)U <U,
implying efficiency, then S =s=0,but Cg* as C1
UU+U
— 2. 1 1 3 nuL.saL1sy u+u
(VId) If r >n/2and if C' and C2 satisfy (r+nA)U U,
imelying efficiency, then C =g*=0,but S s as C'
U U+U
a C2 sa*isf7
1 < 1 3
(l+2A) U>U +U
2 2
(VII) Sufficient conditions, from (VIa—d) ,forS and G to be
both efficient and optimal are that C' and C2 satisfy
(1±2A)U Uand U =(l+2A)U 2 1 3
Note thatthese equalities refer only to the chosen values C1
andC2, althoughthey would clearly be satisfied if the U function
weresuch that (l+2A)U =Uand U =(l+2A)Ufor allvalues
2 1 3
ofa1 and a2.
The possibilities for efficient but not optimal values of
S and G, indicated in (VIa—d) ,illustratethat satisfying the
conditions for efficiency generally does not insure optimalitv.
This conclusion also generalizes the results obtained by Cass
and Yaari. Given their setup, in which UU =0and I =0
for all combinations of c1 and a2, condition (3.1) is equivalent
tocondition (4.1) ,and,hence,if r >n/2and S >0is
efficient,Salso equals s*.More generally, however, even— 13—
withefficiency, if working couples associate positive
marginal utility with both their own consumption and their
parents' consumption, an externality arises that can cause
non—optimality. Specifically, s or g* satisfy conditions
involving U ,U ,U,andU ,whereasS satisfies a condition
1 2 3 4
involvingonly U and U and G satisfies a condition involving
only U and U
1 4
Concernat the margin for parents' consumption, nevertheless,
does not preclude optimality. Specifically, (VIa-d) indicate
that how closely the specification of optirnality corresponds to
the outcome of individual behavior depends on the relation
between A, U ,U,U,andU .Asa special case, indicated
1 2 3 4
in(VII) ,ifthe sufficient condition for efficiency given
in (V) is satisfied, and if, in addition, the marginal utility
working couples associate with their own current consumption
ecuals the marginal utility they associate with their parents'
past consumption, with the latter marginal uiiity weighted
byafactor involving A, individual behavior is optimal.
2. Parents Also Love Children
This part of the paper extends the analysis by assuming that
a working couple's utility depends positively on the prospective
future consumption of each of its children, as well as on the
consumption of its parents. This familial love of parents for
their surviving children creates the possibility of altruistic
behavior in the form of bequests. Allowing for bequests, the
specification of meaningful efficiency conditions requires
the introduction of a technology that incorporates the services
of capital goods, assumed for simplicity to be interchangeable
with consumption goods, as well as labor services, and that
exhibits diminishing returns to capital and labor. The
following analysis, like Diamond's model, specifically assumes
neoclassical production.- 14—
2.1Specification of the Extended Model
Using the same notation developed above, the lifetime
utility of each couple who is working during the current period
nowisgiven by
—1 2 1 2 1 2 — Vc,ct,cti,cti,ct+1ct+i
where the new arguments, c.+l and c1, are the prospective
future consumption of each of its children during their working
years and retired years, respectively. The function V is
increasing in each argument, concave, and twice differentiable.
Again, each first partial derivative approaches infinity as
the value of the respective argument approaches zero.















wherethe new variable, h, is the bequest of consumption goods
received by a couple from each set of its parents. To avoid
the possibility of time inconsistency in the individual couple's
choice problem, assume that the amount of this bequest is
fixed before the couple begins working and its parents retire,
although the bequest is not received until the couple retires
and its parents die. Note that the sum,st-i +
representsthe amount of capital, denoted by kt, that each
current retired couple is making available to provide c'ptai
services that cooperate in current production.— 15—
Theproduction function is linear homogeneous in capital and
labor services, concave, and twice differentiable. Consequently,
current product per worker depends on the current amount of
capital per worker in the form
k k
(6.1)w +(rti—l)
—h=, f'>0and "< °.
Assumingthat the market for capital equates the rate of return





Substitutionof equation (6.2) into equation (6.1) yields a
positive relation between w and kt/fl:
kt kt
(6.3)w = — f'
(h—)
2.2Efficiency nd Optimality in the Extended Model
The steady—state levels of consumption in the extended




Note that the equality, k =s+2k,and the production relations
(6.1-2) imply that, for given n,c1 and c2 depend only on k
and the sum, s +2g.
In efficient steady states, the values of k and s +2g
maximize c2 for given values of c1, subject to equations (7.1—2).
Assuming that f' (0) +1>n/2,and given the production rela-
tions (6.1-2) and the nonnegativity restrictions, we can readily
show that efficiency implies
(8) r =1f'(k/n) =n/2and 2w >s+2g>0.
Condition (8) combines the standard Golden Rule with the— 16—
requirementthat c1 and c2 be nonnegative. This result indicates
that, with neoclassical production, efficiency involves a capital
stock such that the physical rate of return equals the biological
rate of return. This equality implies that the sum of the
bequests received by a couple plus the income earned on these
bequests, 2rh, equals the bequests left by this couple, nh,
and, from equation (7.2) ,thatc2 =rs+ng,as in the basic
model. Beyond a prescription for k and the nonnegativity
conditions, efficiency involves no other restrictions on s, g,
or h.
This latter conclusion is consistent with the analysis of
efficiency in the basic model for the case of r =n/2.The
difference in this regard between the models is that in the basic
model equality between r and n/2 would be fortuitous, whereas
according to condition (8) this equality is required for
efficiency. Note that, if the importance of capital in produc-
tion were so small that the production function did not imply
f' (0) +1>n/2,condition (8) would not apply. Instead,
efficiency would require k =0and, hence, sh =0.In
this situation, the efficiency properties derived in the analysis
of the basic model for the case of r <n/2would be relevant.
Note also that, if, as in the basic model, r and w were
independent of k, and r were larger than n/2, the
efficient value of k would be undefined. This property is
what. necessitates the introduction of neoclassical production
when bequests are allowed.
In an optimal steady state, the values of k and s +2g
maximize V(c1,c2 ,c',c21c1 ,c2) ,subjectto conditions (7.1—2)
Assuming that f' (0) +1>n/2,and given the production rela-
tions (6.1—2) and the nonnegativity restrictions, the first—
order conditions for the solution to the optimality problem are
that the optimal value, k*, satisfies the Golden Rule
efficiency condition,
(9.1) r =1+f'(k/n) =n/2,— 17—
andthat the optimal value,(s +2g)*,has an interior value,
2w >(s+2g)*>0,such that c1 and c2 satisfy
(9.2) -(V +V +V )+ (V +v +v )= 0.
1 3 2 2L 6
Theseoptimality conditions are consistent with the analysis of
optimality in the basic model for the case of r =n/2.Note
that optimality restricts only the sums,s +2hk and s +2g,
and does not imply restrictions beyond nonnegativity on s, g,
or h individually. For example, anyone of s, g, or h can
be zero, but also all three can be positive.
2.3 Individual Behavior in the Extended Model
The choice problem for an individual current working couple
in the extended model is to select values for s, and
to maximize ,subjectto equa-
tions (5.1-6) .Inaddition to the choice variables, these
constrainfr.s involve the exogenous variable, n, the predetermined
variables_-we, hti w1i and h 1—and the
expectational variables--r 9t÷l' r+ir and
With regard to expectations, it seems appropriate to treat
rt, +1, and r÷1 as exogenous,because the individual couple
would not expect its decisions to affect these market—determined
remunerations. The treatment of other expectational variables
should be analogous to the treatment of in the basic model.
Specifically, the simplifying assumption that the function U
is additively separable in ct1 would imply that
and ht+2 are independent of the chosen value of
The relations between these expectational variables and the
chosen values of s and ht+i, however, could be a significant
consideration.In particular, for the cases of interior
solutions, rationality would seem to imply that an increase
wouldcause decreases in and and increases
and ht÷2, whereas an increase in ht+1 would rause— 18—
decreasesin Sb and and increases in and h+2.
These relations, which the interested reader can easily
rationalize, all reflect the substitutability between saving,
giving to parents, and bequests to children as ways to
provide consumption during retired years.
Accounting for variability in the expectational variables,
unfortunately, makes the algebra involved is describing
individual behavior much more complex, analogously to the
complication resulting from introducing the variables A
and A in the basic model, without providing much additional
insight into the workings of the model. Consequently, the
analysis that follows treats all of the expectational variables
as constants. The interested reader can work out the more complete
case. With this simplification, and given the nonnegativity restrictions
and the assumption that the partial derivatives of V approach infinity
as c1, c, c1, c+lF and c+1 approach zero, the first—order
conditions for tlxe solution to this problem require that s, g, and
ht+i satisfy a triple of the following possibie restrictions:
either (10.1)-V+ r V 0 and 2w —2g> s
1t2 t t t
> max [0, —(ht+i
- - 2htI,
or (10.2)-V+ r V < 0 and s =0,and 1 tz t
St
either (10.3)
-.V+ V =0and w -— >g 2 t 2 t
> max [0, htrh_i
(St1 + 2hti)],
or (10.4)-V+ -V< 0 and =0,and
either (10.5)—V + rt+1 V =0and (st+2ht) + > ht+i
h St+1 > max [0,2r t+2 —g2)
-
2 t+1
or (10.6)-V + r+1 V < 0 and ht+l 0.— 19—
LetS. G, H, K, R, W, C1, andC2 now denote the steady—state
values that are consistent with the first-order conditions (10.1—6) ,
equations(5.1-6) ,andthe productivity relations (6.1-2)
Assuming that in a steady state the expectationS-rti w1,
r+i and h+2—-are correct and, hence, are equal,
as appropriate, to R, H, G, W, and S, conditions (10.1-6) imply





or (11.3)RV < V, and
either (11.4) V =RV 22 6
or (11.5)-V> RV 22 6
The applicable pair of these relations implies which of the triples
from conditions (10.1-6) can be relevant in the steady state.
The important observation to be stressed in the present con-
text is that the sufficient conditions for efficiency and
optimality in the extended model are similar to the analogous
conditions in the basic model. Specifically, conditions (8)
(10.1—6) ,and(11.1—5) imply the following:
(VIII) Sufficient conditions for K and S + 2G to be efficient
are that C and C2 satisfy V =V=V
2 6
To derive (VIII) ,observethat, if C' and 02 satisfy V =V=V
2 6
the pairs of conditions (11.1) and (11.5) ,(11.2)and (11.4)
(11.2) and (11.5) ,and(11.3) and (11.4) are obviously inconsistent,
and the pair of conditions (11.3) and (11.5) is also inconsistent,
because it would require R < n/2, but, from conditions (10.1-6) ,
italso implies K =0and, hence, R > n/2. Conseauently,
the only possible case from conditions (11.1—5) is that C and C2— 20—
satisfythe pair of conditions (11.1) and (11.4) and, moreover,
that K and R satisfy R =n/2.In this case, the sum, S +2H=K,
satisfies the efficiency condition, 1 +f'(K/n) =n/2,and
the sum, S +2G,has an efficient interior value, 2W >S
+2G>0,that satisfies the equivalent conditions (10.1) and
(10.3), with S>0, G>0, and H>0.
With regard to optimality, conditions (9.1-2) ,(10.1—6)
and (11.1—5) imply the following:
(IX) Sufficient conditions for K and S +2Gto be both
efficient and optimal are that C1 and C2 satisfy
V =V =V and V =V =V.
2 6 1 5
Toderive (IX) ,recallthe derivation of (VIII) and observe
that, if C1 and C2 satisfy V =V=Vand V V V
2 6 1 5
conditions(10.1) and (10.3) are equivalent in the steady state
to condition (9.2)
These results say that if the marginal utilities that
working couples associate with their own prospective retirement
consumption, their parents' current retirement consumption,
and their children's prospective retirement consumption are
equal, individual behavior is efficient. Specifically, the
steady state that is consistent with individual behavior has
the Golden Rule capital stock. Moreover, if, in addition,
the marginal utilities that working couples associate with
their own current consumption, their parents' past consumption,
and their children's prospective consumption during their
working years are equal, individual behavior is also optimal.— 21—
3. Concluding Remarks
This paper is preliminary in that it does consider a
number of important issues that arise naturally in the present
context. First, the analysis has dealt only with the
description and evaluation of steady states. It has not
considered the stability of steady states or the normative
properties of nonsteady-state paths. Second, the analysis
has assumed fertility to be an exogenous constant, rather than
a choice variable. Willis (1979) analyzes the choice of
fertility in a model in which giving to parents is positive,
but exogenously determined, and there is no Saving.Third,
the analysis has not considered the possible effects of
government financial policies, such as debt issue and social
security. Questions about the impact of these policies have
motivated the recent work of Barro, Drazen, and Buiter,
referred to above. Fourth, the analysis has abstracted from
investment in human capital, a phenomenon on which DrazenTs
paper focuses. Finally, this paper has made no attempts to
compare the present interpretation that gifts and bequests
involve altruistic behavior with the hypothesis, recently
advanced by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1979), that gifts and bequests
reflect risk—sharing behavior. Each of these issues is the
subject of currently ongoing research.
What this paper has accomplished can be summarized as
follows: The paper has analyzed the intertemporal efficiency
and optimality of steady states within overlapping—generations
models in which the utility of individual working couples
depends on the consumption of their parents and children as
well as their own consumption. The analysis has considered
both a basic model in which altruistic behavior can take only
the form of gifts of consumption goods from working couples
to their retired parents and an extended model in which
altruistic behavior also can take the form of bequests from
parents to their surviving children. In the basic model,— 22—
savingonly involves storing consumption goods, whereas the
extended model includes capital and neoclassical production.
The following conclusions from the analysis apply to
both models: An altruistic utility function promotes inter-
temporal efficiency. However, altruism creates an externality
that implies that satisfying the conditions for efficiency
does not insure intertemporal optimality. Nevertheless, if
the utility of working couples is appropriately sensitive at
the margin to their own consumption, their parents'
consumption, and their children's consumption, the steady
state that is consistent with individual behavior is both
efficient and optimal.— 23—
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